Friday, December 20, 2013

2014 Top Prospect List: #5 Michael Lorenzen, rhp

Courtesy: MILB
DOB: 1/4/1992
HEIGHT: 6-3, WEIGHT: 180, B/T: R/R

Michael Lorenzen was one of the more interesting prospects in the 2013 draft because he played both ways at Cal State Fullerton, leaving some question as to what path his career would follow. Early reports indicated that the Reds were planning on letting Lorenzen pitch AND play centerfield, but it now seems clear that they intend to develop him solely as a starting pitcher. That was likely their intention all along.

Whether pitch or play, Lorenzen brings plus athleticism, versatility, good size, and strong make-up to the table. So, those are the raw materials that the Reds will need to shape into a productive ballplayer. On the personal side, Lorenzen has a strong religious belief, going so far as to write bible verses on the baseball cards that he autographs to encourage people to look them up. Faith is a large part of his life.

The Reds obviously have faith in Lorenzen and hope he can step right in to help prop up a beleaguered farm system.


The Reds selected Lorenzen out of Cal State Fullerton with the 38th overall pick in Competitive Balance Round A of the 2013 draft. Lorenzen was a surprising pick for a number of reasons. First, it was a touch earlier than he was expected to be taken. Second, most teams viewed him as a position player rather than a pitcher.

As a position player, Lorenzen was a plus defensive centerfielder with, naturally, a rocket for an arm. The hit tool, however, came with significant question marks attached. He seemed short on both power and on-base skill, putting a lot of pressure on the development of the hit tool. All of which led some teams to prefer him on the mound. The Reds were one of those teams.

At Fullerton, Lorenzen actually pitched very little, spending most of his time roaming the outfield. For comparison sake, he only pitched 44.2 innings while logging 596 ABs at the plate. He didn't pitch much, but when he did it was in high leverage situations.

As a sophomore, he tossed 22.0 innings in which he posted a 1.23 ERA, 0.95 WHIP, 17/5 K/BB ratio, and 16 saves.

As a junior, he tossed 22.2 innings to go along with a 1.99 ERA, 0.93 WHIP, 20/4 K/BB ratio, and 19 saves.

In short stints, he was very effective on the mound, but the Reds are developing him as a starting pitcher. As a starter, he won't be able to lean quite as heavily on his fastball, so he'll need to broaden his repertoire to have success the second and third times through the batting order.


The decision by MLB to move the signing deadline for draftees up allows more players to get their feet wet in professional ball in the year in which they were drafted. In Lorenzen's case, he actually had time to make four separate minor league stops. It was odd development plan.

Lorenzen tossed 1.0 inning in the Arizona rookie league, 8.1 innings in low-A Dayton, 5.2 innings for high-A Bakersfield, and 6.0 innings for double-A Pensacola. Across the four stops, Lorenzen posted a cumulative 3.00 ERA, 19/13 K/BB ratio, and a 1.50 GB/FB ratio.

It was a successful debut in that Lorenzen compiled substantial and varied experience. The performance was certainly respectable, but the sample size is too small to draw any real conclusions. I have no idea what benefit the organization saw in bouncing him around four different levels in such a short period of time, but if I had to hazard a guess I would say that they really had no idea just how much he could handle and wanted to push him to the limit to determine at which level to start him in 2014. Though, it might have been done to pair him up with certain coaches, to get him out of a hitter-friendly Bakersfield ballpark, or to get him seen by enough coaches and scouts to confirm their plan to develop him as a pitcher. Or, maybe another reason entirely.

After the season, the Reds added a fifth stop to Lorenzen's CV by sending him to the Arizona Fall League, where the results were both underwhelming and irrelevant. Another bit of experience to get him ready for his first full season of professional baseball in 2014.

During his time in the AFL, Lorenzen gave an interview in which he discussed getting acclimated to the role of starting pitcher. It was a revealing article because it showed just how raw Lorenzen really is on the mound, including the need to get a pitcher's toeplate for the very first time.

A couple of quotes of note:

"I'm just ready to compete, and I'm working my butt off to get my body in good enough shape -- in pitcher's shape, not center-field shape -- to where I have that longevity and I'm not just a power guy," Lorenzen said. "I'm still going to throw hard and I'm still going to come at you. But I think there's more of a strategy to it than just coming out and throwing my hardest and having the power breaking ball and all that."


"I think the biggest thing is just building up my arm strength, getting better command of all three of my pitches and just figuring out what kind of pitcher I'm going to be," Lorenzen said. "Just getting used to the starting role."

Lorenzen doesn't know what type of pitcher he's going to be, needs to get into pitching shape, and acclimate to the routine of starting pitching. It's encouraging how agreeable he is to the role change, but it's disconcerting how inexperienced he is with pitching. He almost comes off like the star of his little league team who excels at every position based on youthful exuberance and "aw shucks" natural ability, without really understanding the position.


Lorenzen's mechanics are clean, efficient, and smooth. He generates plus velocity with low effort mechanics. There's a lot to like, especially from a part-time pitcher. You can also readily see Lorenzen's good athleticism in the balance and body control, which should enable him to repeat his delivery. I didn't always appreciate, or maybe understand, the importance of athleticism to a pitcher until I watched A's/Rockies southpaw Brett Anderson pitch. Anderson is a wonderful talent, but he's not very athletic and it shows in his delivery, fielding, and propensity to fall down (literally). That won't be a problem for Lorenzen.
Courtesy: Unknown

Lorenzen stands tall on the mound, which when coupled with his 6-3 stature should allow him to work on a downward plane.

After he breaks his hands, Lorenzen uses an arm swing with a bit of stab to it. Out of the glove, he drops his pitching hand straight down behind his right hip, where it lingers before coming up into throwing position. Some pitchers can do this effectively, Tim Lincecum utilizes a similar move, but Lorenzen's move seems a bit disjointed, with a longer pause behind the right hip reducing the fluidity of the arm swing. Whether it's a problem remains to be seen, but a more fluid arm swing might improve his consistency and command.

Lorenzen utilizes a very strong and high leg kick. In the leg kick, his knee comes up well past parallel and he incorporates some body coil through a small wrapping of the leg, all of which helps generate force to impart to the baseball through the kinetic chain.

Lorenzen gets into a very strong position at the apex of his leg kick. From apex, he gathers himself well before driving to the plate, maintaining his balance over the rubber. However, his drive to the plate isn't as strong as it could be and might benefit from a more aggressive and slightly longer stride. The less aggressive drive to the plate limits the explosiveness of his hip rotation, which results in a minimal differential between hip rotation and shoulder rotation. The minimal differential between the hip and shoulder rotations reduces the effectiveness of the kinetic chain and shifts more of the force generation and stress to the arm. So, his mechanics are clean and fundamentally sound, but there is some inefficiency there, too.

He throws from a high three-quarters arm slot, which may improve the movement but reduce the downward plane on his pitches. The arm action itself is very clean. His elbow maintains good position relative to the shoulder throughout his delivery and the timing is correct as he brings his arm up into proper throwing position at foot strike.

As for the follow-through, Lorenzen gets good extension that carries him out over his stride leg and should help him throw on a downward plane. He also incorporates a proper deceleration phase that should reduce injury risk. He finishes up in a balanced, proper fielding position. One of the things that I loved about Josh Ravin was that he possessed both power and balance/body control. He was able to generate top tier velocity without losing body control. Lorenzen has that same ability.

Here's a look at Lorenzen courtesy of Steve Fiorindo on YouTube:

This video shows more than enough for me to buy into Lorenzen. The mechanics are smooth without any red flags, the plus velocity is apparent, and the slurve he throws at the 0:24 mark shows the plus potential of the pitch. So, the foundation for success is there, but he's undoubtedly very raw. He's going to need to put in a lot of work, but his max projection is that of an impact starting pitcher.

If I could change one thing about his delivery, then I'd like to see a slightly longer stride and stronger drive to the plate. He should take that athleticism and body control out for a spin by being more aggressive with his lower half. If you have the body control and athleticism necessary to harness and control maximum force generation, then it seems wasteful to generate anything less than maximum force. By lengthening the stride, he'd create more room for the hips to clear and possibly increase the differential between hip and shoulder rotation.

Overall, Lorenzen has fundamentally sound pitching mechanics with room for a bit of refinement. His mechanics are a rarity in that they generate plus velocity with minimal effort, which should provide both performance and mitigation of injury risk benefits. His limited experience makes it difficult to know how effectively he'll be able to repeat his delivery, but his plus athleticism should help him in that department. Overall, his mechanics provide an impressive and encouraging developmental starting point, especially for someone who has only been a part-time pitcher to this point.


Lorenzen has two primary pitches. A fastball that sits 93-95 and touches 97 with good movement, especially arm-side run, and a hard breaking ball that has been variously described as a curveball and a slider. So, let's label it a slurve for now, but whatever the label, it's an impressive, if inconsistent, offering. It has a tight spin and biting break. If he can improve its consistency, then it's not hard to envision it buckling the knees of hapless hitters. He's also working on a third pitch, a changeup with good potential and good sink.

If Lorenzen is going to start, then he'll need to refine his secondary offerings and improve the command of his fastball. If he's going to relieve, then he'll need to improve the consistency of his breaking ball.

Given just how little Lorenzen has actually pitched, it's impressive that he already has the makings of two plus-pitches and it's natural to wonder what a little experience will do for his repertoire.


I really like Michael Lorenzen. He wasn't on my radar last draft because he's not as interesting as a position player and he spent so little time on the mound. So, it was somewhat surprising when the Reds drafted him with the 38th overall pick. However, it didn't take long for me to get on board.

The mechanics are smooth and fundamentally sound. The raw stuff flashes plus. The physical stature is good for a pitcher. The athleticism could allow him to effectively repeat his mechanics. Despite his limited experience on the mound, he's starting off his professional career at a fairly advanced point on the pitching development curve. The question is just how far he can advance from that starting point as his experience grows and grows.

Lorenzen is another example of a bold draft selection by the Reds front office. These bold selections really give the feeling that they really have a plan of what they want to do and are confident enough to execute it. They obviously didn't view him as anything other than a pitcher with a position player fallback option. They saw enough in Lorenzen to believe that he could be successfully converted to the rotation. And, given his clean mechanics, plus fastball, and the plus potential of his slurve, they may well be right.

If everything breaks right, then Lorenzen could develop into an impact starting pitcher. There is, however, a very wide range of potential career outcomes for Lorenzen, so he does have some real development risk.

Even so, his blend of upside and risk is enough to land him at #5 on the list.

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

2014 Top Prospect List: #7 Carlos Contreras, rhp

DOB: 1/8/1991
HEIGHT: 5-11, WEIGHT: 205, B/T: R/R

In the past couple of years, the Reds farm system felt thin at the upper levels. Now, it feels thin just about everywhere. That's problematic because the Reds haven't been able to get over the hump at the MLB level and now face two division rivals who rival the Reds' talent at both the major and minor league levels. However, there a few prospects who could develop into valuable pieces for the Reds if they can manage their remaining development risk. One such prospect is Carlos Contreras.

The Reds have done a nice job of stocking the farm system with prospects signed out of Latin America. Curiously enough, aside from Aroldis Chapman, they have had better success with the inexpensive signings (i.e. Cueto, Gregorius, Corcino, Contreras, etc) than they have with the more high profile signings (i.e. Yorman Rodriguez, Juan Duran, etc).

If Contreras can step forward into potential impact prospect status, then it would really boost the farm system going forward.


Patience. That's what the organization has been with Contreras, who was signed by the Reds out of the Dominican Republic in 2008. The Reds were conservative during his first four professional seasons, sending him to various short season rookie leagues. He spent the first two in the Dominican Summer Leagues, the third season in the Arizona Rookie League, and the fourth with the Billings Mustangs in the Pioneer League.

Finally, in 2012, he was ready for full season ball and split time between low-A and high-A. Even in full season ball, he only logged only 60.2 total innings. To that point, he worked primarily as a reliever, but the Reds took the training wheels off in 2013.

Courtesy: Getty Images

In 2013, Contreras moved into the rotation full-time. He started out in high-A Bakersfield, more commonly known as hitter's heaven, and more than held his own. He threw 90.0 innings over 18 starts in which he posted a 3.80 ERA, 1.23 WHIP, 4.1 BB/9, and a 9.6 K/9. Impressively, he maintained the high strikeout rate that he flashed out of the bullpen over longer outings in the rotation. He earned a bump to double-A Pensacola.

For the Blue Wahoos, Contreras actually found a bit tougher sledding. He actually dropped his ERA, but his peripherals took a tumble. He worked 42.1 innings over 8 starts, posting a 2.76 ERA, 1.35 WHIP, 4.5 BB/9, and 5.5 K/9. He'll need a return engagement at double-A, but overall it was a strong season and a significant step forward in his development.

Finally, in the middle of his 2013 season, Contreras made an appearance in the MLB Futures Game. During his appearance, Contreras worked exclusively out of the stretch. Of course, the first batter he faced reached base and there were runners on base the rest of the time, but he still started off the inning out of the stretch. Maybe not surprising given his bullpen background, but maybe reflective of a lingering reliever mindset.

He worked 2/3 of an inning and had to consistently work through some trouble. It's difficult to draw too many conclusions from such a short appearance, but his fastball seemed to clock in from 89-96. His change-up was very impressive, showing good tailing and sinking action. The bottom really fell out of it. The breaking ball was tougher to get a read on, as he threw a couple of mid-70s breaking balls that were loose and really rolled, but also some tighter, sharper breaking pitches in the low 80s.

Early in his appearance, the hitters squared up his fastball consistently. Later in the appearance, his fastball velocity increased to the mid-90s. He showed the ability to work both sides of the plate with the fastball to lefties, but wasn't as precise with his fastball to righties.


Contreras starts with strong rocker step towards first base, allowing him to rotate his plant foot down and onto the rubber. That strong first step flows smoothly up into his leg kick, which subsequently flows into his stride. There's a real and natural fluidity to his mechanics. After the rocker step, he rotates his body and brings his leg up into the leg kick. His leg kick comes up a tick past parallel and includes some leg wrap, which generates tension in the spine through body coil.

At apex, Contreras maintains good balance and effectively stays over his plant leg to gather his momentum before driving to the plate. He has a fluid unpacking of the leg kick and solid stride length. His stride isn't quite as long as might be optimal, but it's long enough that it allows him to (1) effectively rotate the hips, and (2) effectively get his momentum out over the stride leg in the delivery.

As for his arm action, it's clean. He maintains his elbow in proper position relative to his shoulder throughout the delivery and gets his arm up into proper throwing position at foot strike. He uses a high three-quarters arm slot with a loose arm action.

After he releases the pitch, he enters into the deceleration phase. However, Contreras occasionally has a bit of recoil in his delivery. After his pitching arm comes down past his left hip, it occasionally bounces back up, instead of finishing low on his left side, a bit more than is ideal. This recoil occurs in tandem with an upright follow-through, as his upper body doesn't release and finish out over his plant leg, which restricts the ability of the delivery to dissipate the force.

Here's a look at Contreras in action, courtesy of ProspectNotes on YouTube:

The consistent knock on Contreras in the scouting community is that he's "long in the back", a result of a long arm swing, leading to inconsistency in release point. But, I'm not overly concerned about that. If there's anything that jumps out to me it's that he seems highly rotational in his delivery. Instead of driving his momentum directly to the plate, his momentum seems to rotate around his body a tick too much. The main reason for that is the shoulder rotation, which seems to happen earlier than I'd like to see. The shoulder rotation in combination with the lower arm slot and upright follow-through gives his delivery a rotational look.

If I was going to address the control problems, then I'd start by having him keep his lead shoulder tucked in longer. I'm not really worried about the longer arm-action in the back, but if he flies open too soon with the front shoulder, then he may consistently miss his spot to the arm-side with the fastball and may pull his breaking ball too far to the glove-side. If he drives his chest towards home plate a bit more, then it'll help delay the rotation of the shoulders a tick longer, give him a less upright finish in the follow-through, and improve the consistency of his release point.

Overall, Contreras has solid, functional mechanics. On one hand, there aren't any major red flags indicating heightened injury risk, on the other they aren't so impressive that they'll lead to increased performance benefits.


Contreras features a fastball that sits 92-94 and touches 97. His change-up has plus potential and very good tailing, sinking action. He also uses a slurvy breaking ball that sits in the low 80s, though I've seen a few slower pitches in the mid-70s, but needs to be tightened up to avoid inconsistency and rolling. His change-up is currently more advanced than his breaking ball, which means he is frequently more effective against lefties than righties. The change-up sinks and tails away from lefthanded hitters, while the breaking ball isn't always sharp enough to be effective against righthanders.

Another consideration is whether Contreras' height will allow him to succeed against advanced competition, as he'll struggle to get downward plane on the fastball, leaving him with a flatter fastball that lingers longer in the contact zone. However, fastball effectiveness is largely a function of (1) velocity, (2) movement, (3) command, and (4) downward plane. You don't need all four components to have an effective fastball, but you do need the right mix.

Tim Lincecum is a good example. He's also an "under six feet" righthanded pitcher, but his fastball helped him win two Cy Young awards because of its plus velocity and movement. Early in his career, it didn't matter that he lacked downward plane and it didn't matter that he didn't have Greg Maddux like command. However, now that he's in mid-career and has ~1400 MLB innings under his belt, his velocity has declined to the point that the lack of both plus command and downward plane has become problematic.

The component mix on Lincecum's fastball is out of balance and, as a result, he's struggling because he now lacks the velocity to overcome shortfalls in the other components. The result is that Tim Lincecum is more hittable than he used to be, as his fastball is now flat and slow. To take his game back to his previous performance level, he'll need to find improvements in fastball command or velocity.

The takeaway is that Contreras doesn't necessarily need significant downward plane to be successful as long as his blend of velocity, command, and movement is sufficient to overcome the flatter plane on his fastball. Currently, his velocity is strong, but he'll need to show improved command or movement to get away with minimal plane on his fastball.

While he has the right blend of components to have an effective fastball, he still needs to refine his breaking ball, as he can't work effectively in the rotation with just a fastball and plus change-up.


In a farm system that is short on both depth and upper echelon talent, Contreras makes for an intriguing prospect. He needs to refine his repertoire in order to avoid having a reverse platoon split, as he currently lacks a consistently effective breaking ball that moves away from righties. His change-up has very good sink and tails away from lefties, so as of now he's better suited to success against opposite side hitters, which is unusual. He also needs to refine his mechanics to take his command and control up a notch.

There is still some development risk with Contreras, as despite the slow march up the development ladder, he still has some work to do. Ideally, he'll develop into a viable starting pitcher, but a return to the bullpen is a legitimate fallback option. His fastball would play up in short stints and a limited repertoire would play better without having to face hitters two and three times a game.

Still, there are some intriguing elements to his game that could, if things break right, turn him into a valuable pitcher at the MLB level. Given that the Reds have locked in several players to long-term extensions and have several more on the verge of big paydays, they could use all the inexpensive homegrown talent they can find.

Contreras has some work to do, but for now he lands at #7 on the list.

Friday, December 13, 2013

Review: 2013 Predictions

Just a touch more housekeeping before I can officially close the book on the 2013 season. Time for a quick spin through my pre-season prognostications to see, for better or worse, just how I fared.

I made two types of predictions prior to the season: 1) breakout candidates and 2) awards and playoff teams. The former went a bit better than the latter, so let's start there.

Breakout Candidates

I picked two players I thought were lining up for breakout seasons in 2013: Tigers RHP Rick Porcello and Brewers CF Carlos Gomez.

Starting with Rick:

Porcello was a player whose peripheral stats over the past few years were trending towards a breakout. He didn't breakout quite as much as I expected, but it was definitely a big step forward for Rick and I wonder if a better team defense would have taken him the rest of the way. In light of the Tigers restructuring their team defense for 2014, including wizard Jose Iglesias at short, Miguel Cabrera shifting back over to first, and prospect Nick Castellanos sliding in at third, I would probably double-down on another step forward for Porcello next year.

But, the important part is that the strong peripherals began to emerge in his overall performance level. He tossed 177.0 innings in which he logged an improving 4.32 ERA and 1.28 WHIP. Again, not quite the breakthrough I expected and again the peripherals (3.53 FIP and 3.19 xFIP) are kinder to him than the overall production, but it's another step in the right direction. And, he provided yet another data point on his impressive trend lines:

2009: 2.74
2010: 2.10
2011: 2.27
2012: 2.25
2013: 2.14

2009: 55.4%
2010: 57.0%
2011: 61.4%
2012: 62.8%
2013: 60.6%

2009: 7.0%
2010: 5.9%
2011: 6.3%
2012: 7.5%
2013: 8.6%

2009: 4.69
2010: 4.65
2011: 5.14
2012: 5.46
2013: 7.22

2009: 4.9%
2010: 7.7%
2011: 10.5%
2012: 15.8%
2013: 5.5%

2009: 1.89
2010: 1.57
2011: 1.73
2012: 2.36
2013: 2.34

Keep an eye on Porcello for 2014. The peripherals are still there and, in some cases, stronger. Add in a vastly improved infield defense and it could be a significant breakthrough. It's also interesting to see the Tigers trade Doug Fister instead of Rick Porcello, so maybe they are expecting a breakout, too. But, for now I'll settle for another step forward, instead of a true breakout, from his 2013 season. 

And, over to Carlos Gomez:

My Gomez prediction was based less on stats and peripherals than Porcello, and more on tools, swing mechanics, and bat-speed, but I was confident that there was a breakout season coming. Here's what I wrote: 

For 2013, most projections have Gomez hitting fewer than 20 homers. If healthy, I'm actually expecting him to hit 25 bombs and steal at least 35 bases. I'll be very surprised if he doesn't hit at least 20 homers. And, I think there's a non-zero chance that there's a very big season on the horizon for Gomez (30/50?, 40/40?) in the next couple of seasons.

If I was a bettin' man (which I'm not) or the Brewer GM (which I'm not), I'd be comfortable betting on the future of Carlos Gomez.

Gomez ended up hitting .284 with 24 homers and 40 stolen bases. So, he hit one fewer homer than I expected and stole 5 more bases. It was a massively valuable season and he flashed glimpses of the "very big season" that might be on the horizon. He's just an electric ballplayer and fun to watch. 

Overall, I think it's fair to say that 2013 was indeed a breakout season for Carlos Gomez. 

Awards and Postseason Standings

So, I'd say it's reasonable to say that I was 1.5 for 2 on my breakout prognostications. I didn't fair quite as well on my off-the-cuff award and postseason predictions. 

In the NL, I missed entirely on the awards, overvaluing the Nats and the Reds and failing to foresee Taveras' season long injury issues: 

NL MVP: Bryce Harper
NL Cy Young: Stephen Strasburg
NL ROY: Oscar Taveras
NL MOY: Dusty Baker

In the AL, I nailed the ROY winner and had, at the very least, worthy candidates for MVP and Cy Young:

AL MVP: Mike Trout
AL Cy Young: Chris Sale
AL ROY: Wil Myers
AL MOY: Joe Madden

As for postseason predictions, well, those really aren't worth mentioning, but I obviously overvalued those teams that tried to buy their way to a title. You can check those out and give me any grief that I deserve.

Thursday, December 12, 2013

Dusty Baker: The Natural Man

The Wolfman; Universal Studios

Lawrence Talbot: "Villagers still have the same wild ideas."

Sir John Talbot: "Yes, well, very provincial lot, I must say. Ignorant, superstitious. to a worldly man such as yourself we are savages at the end of the Earth. All I'm saying is that you dismiss the natural man at your peril."  
---The Wolfman

Sabermetricians are a worldly lot. Dusty Baker is a natural man. The former dismiss the latter at their peril.

At the end of another disappointing season, the Reds handed Dusty Baker his walking papers. His dismissal has me reflecting on Dusty and the long, strange path I've traveled in my views of him over the course of his managerial career. Quite the reverse, I suspect, of most Reds fans, I traveled the road from disdain to grudging respect for Dusty. In some respects, he won me over.

Sabermetricians are a worldly lot with a world view formed by education, rational thought, and science. Dusty Baker is a natural man with a world view formed by personal experience, intuition, and tradition. Given these wildly differing perspectives, it's hardly surprising that these two groups are constantly at odds.

I've been dismissing Baker for years. In fact, prior to his hire, if you had asked me for a list of those candidates that I wouldn't want to manage the Reds, then Dusty quite literally would have been at the top of the list. My issues with Baker weren't new or novel. In fact, they were those cited most by his critics. First, he overworks his starting pitchers. Second, he favors underwhelming veterans to young talent. And, third, he doesn't value on-base percentage.

Dusty's first problem was largely eliminated by an industry-wide shift in what constitutes reasonable pitching workloads. He still skews towards the upper end of the reasonableness range, but his natural tendencies are now confined in ways that they previously were not. The industry has eliminated one of his biggest issues. So, now we're down to two problems.

As for the second problem, aside from the decision to give Ryan Hanigan the majority of the playing time over Devin Mesoraco (more on that later), Dusty has done a better job embracing youth. Maybe this was an issue made irrelevant by the Reds renewed emphasis on player development and the ways in which the roster was constructed, leaving Dusty little choice but to embrace youth. Or, maybe it was always an overstated issue, the result of his teams' rosters being littered with aging players. Whatever the reason, this issue never seemed to emerge in Cincinnati. Down to one problem.

The third problem, well, let's be honest, continues to be a problem. Dusty will never live down his "base clogging" comment. He values speed over on-base ability. His flirtations with Corey Patterson and Wily Taveras were difficult to stomach and even more difficult to justify. Dusty will never value on-base percentage the way he should.
Courtesy: AP

Whether it was of his own doing or a shifting workplace environment, Dusty evolved to the point that he eliminated two of my biggest problems with him. The on-base percentage issue will always be a large one, no denying it, but most of the criticism of Dusty these days is directed to his tactical decisions.

In many ways, that's fair criticism, as roster construction and in-game strategy are not one of Dusty's strengths. Not coincidentally, the tactical is the easiest aspect of the job for sabermetricians to evaluate. It's much more difficult to quantify the other areas of the manager job. And, there ARE other areas of the job.

For example, Theo Epstein recently stated that he was evaluating the Cubs' manager by "looking at the development of young players; in-game decision making; the way (the manager) used the roster; the manager's ability to create a culture of accountability; hard work and preparation; and the ability to develop solid, trusting relationship with the players."

Not surprisingly, it's far more difficult to quantify the impact of a manager in some of those areas. And yet, those areas still matter. Those areas still impact on-field performance. Those areas still drive team success. Unfortunately for Dusty, he excels in those areas that are difficult to evaluate/quantify and struggles in those areas that are more easily evaluated/quantified. His managerial mix is easy to criticize and difficult to defend.  

Or, put more succinctly by Theo Epstein: "In the information age, things that are precisely measured are rewarded disproportionally relative to impact."

Over his 20 year managerial career, Dusty Baker has a 1671-1504 win/loss record, good for a .526 winning percentage, spread over three different organizations. His career includes eight seasons of 90 or more wins. That's an impressive career and with each successful stop it becomes more difficult to discount Dusty's positive impact. Only the most strident Dusty-haters chalk that success up to luck and player personnel. Dusty deserves some real credit. At the same time, his postseason career has been far less successful.

The disparity between his regular season success and postseason struggles is not that surprising. Dusty is weak in tactical decision-making, which is far more likely to rear its head in a short postseason series where the impact of a single play can make all the difference. Dusty is strong in managing egos, developing solid, trusting relationships, and getting the most out of his players, which is far more likely to make an impact over the course of a 162-game season.

Dusty's strengths have brought him substantial regular season success. Dusty's weaknesses have resulted in underwhelming postseason results. The reasons for Dusty's postseason failures are easier to identify than the reasons for Dusty's regular season successes.

I'm a proponent of statistical analysis. I love the way it has illuminated the game, a shining light revealing new truths. However, as Theo mentioned above, statistical analysis has an inherent bias towards those areas that can be quantified. However, just because something can't be quantified, doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. It MAY mean that something doesn't exist or it MAY mean that we just haven't figured out how to quantify it yet. The absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence.

What sabermetricians are able to study, they typically study very well. It's difficult to argue with math, after all. However, the things that are not (or maybe are not yet) quantifiable occasionally prove to be blind spots for sabermetricians. After all, the value of a commodity is necessarily determined in relation to the value of everything else. If sabermetricians cannot effectively study a specific area, then they inevitably de-emphasize its importance merely by focusing on those areas that CAN be effectively studied.

If the worldly man cannot recognize what he does not know, then his opinions may be less valid than those of the natural man. In this context, statistical analysis may not be more accurate than simple intuition and personal experience. Dusty may have illustrated precisely this in his handling of the Hanigan/Mesoraco situation (I told you we'd circle back around to these guys).

Dusty took a fair amount of heat for continuing to give Hanigan the majority of the playing time in 2012 and 2013. People were in love with Mesoraco's upside, offensive potential, and prospect ranking, but Dusty seemed to place a greater emphasis on Ryan Hanigan's game calling and handling of the pitching staff.

This is arguably an instance where Dusty's personal experience, intuition, and adherence to tradition were more insightful than the education, rational thought, and science of sabermetricians. Dusty's intuition about the catcher situation, which may have more accurately valued the impact of catcher defense, was arguably more valid than the statistical analysis perspective, which has only recently begun to study pitch framing.

In other words, Dusty was probably right in his decision to start Hanigan over Mesoraco.

There's an ESPN Insider article about the value of pitch framing that's worth a read, but since it's Insider content I'll just post a snippet that's instructive regarding a weakness of sabermetrics:

"There's an old joke about economists that I'll reframe here to make a point: A sabermetician loses his keys while leaving a bar late at night. He crosses the street and starts looking for his keys under the streetlight. His friend asks him, "Why aren't you looking in front of the bar where you dropped them?" The sabermetician replies, "Because I can't see over there!"
Before Turkenkopf used pitch data to investigate catcher framing in 2008, sabermeticians generally valued catcher defense less than, for lack of a better term, baseball people did. The lesson for sabermetrics is that pitch framing existed and was important well before the pitch data that gave light to it became available. Value exists even in the areas we can't yet see."

The take-away from all of this? Statistical analysis is tremendously valuable, but it does have inherent weaknesses and limitations. As with most things, the most important thing to know is what you don't know. And, it's important not to discount those people with views based on personal experience, intuition, and tradition solely because their views are based on personal experience, intuition, and tradition. Sometimes those views turn out to be the most valid.

Dismiss the natural man at your own peril, especially one with 1671 career wins under his belt.

Sunday, December 8, 2013

Bryan Price: Job #1 "Relief Ace"

For the very first act of his managerial career, Bryan Price should announce a role change for Aroldis Chapman.

I know, I know. I can already hear you shouting through the screen: "They have no inclination to take your brilliant and inspired suggestion to trade him and Aroldis continues to announce loud and proud to anyone who will listen that he won't start games, so how can Price change his role???"

Well, Bryan Price needs to come right out and say: "Aroldis is NOT going to be our Closer in 2014, he's going to be our Relief Ace." 

First and foremost, the team needs to let Aroldis know who calls the shots. These statements to the press by Aroldis about what he's willing and not willing to do give the appearance of the tail wagging the dog. Someone on the team, and here's where we could use some leadership in the clubhouse, should polite remind Aroldis that he'll play when and where the organization wants or he won't play at all; that while he can express these ideas to management behind closed doors, it's completely inappropriate to be making these statements to the press. But, I digress. 

Price is already on record as saying he wants to extract more value from Aroldis, so his thoughts are clearly running in this direction anyway, so why not go whole-hog and fundamentally change the way bullpens are managed? Why not be an "early adopter" and reap the benefits that go along with it? Formally announce the change in roles to ensure that people's expectations for Chapman change accordingly. Changing the usage pattern without formally changing the name of the role would reduce fan buy-in and increase resistance to the change. 

If we are managing our bullpen more effectively and efficiently than other organizations, then we are building a competitive advantage. And, given that this team is close to getting over the hump, the marginal value of a win is very high. So, every competitive advantage should be actively sought out and exploited. 

So, what's the difference between a "closer" and a "relief ace"? Namely, usage patterns. As we all know, closers are used when save situations arrive. The concept of the "closer" is so ingrained in the baseball woodwork that it's functionally impossible to change the usage pattern without changing the label. The problem becomes even more intractable when you factor in that reliever compensation is frequently tied to the concept of the "save", so there will be resistance from closers and agents, as well. Again, it's ingrained. So, to make this work, we need not only a clean break from the "closer" concept, but an entirely new label. Fortunately, some forward thinking sabermetricians have advanced the idea of the "relief ace" and it suits our purposes perfectly. 

The "Relief Ace" usage pattern would be based on "leverage", not "save situations." In short, the greater the value of a single run in a game, the higher leverage the situation. In other words, the more likely that a situation will impact the outcome of the game, the higher the leverage. So, a bases loaded situation with 0 outs in the 9th inning of a tie ballgame is about as high leverage as it gets. That's a situation wherein the "Closer" may or may not be used, but the "Relief Ace" absolutely would. On the other hand, a bases empty situation in the 2nd inning of a 15-0 game is about as low leverage as it gets.

Intuitively, the "relief ace" idea makes a tremendous amount of sense. Don't you want your best reliever pitching when his contribution will make the greatest impact on the team's chances of winning? Of course! If you want Aroldis to be more valuable, then you have to use him in situations where he can generate value. Again, as with pitch framing, value is a function of opportunity. Give Aroldis more opportunities and he'll deliver more value.

This is also a perfect way for Bryan Price to immediately put his own stamp on the organization and make a clean break from any residual fan disdain for Dusty Baker. This is a fan base thirsting for a forward-thinking approach. It not only allows him to immediately differentiate himself from the tradition-bound strategies of his predecessor, but it has the added benefit of being good business. It's clear that, if done correctly, it's a move that would more effectively deploy the bullpen. 

Now, the "problem" with this switch is that using Aroldis earlier in the game means he won't always be there to slam the door in the 9th. And, inevitably, some of those saves will be blown, which will ratchet-up public and pundit resistance to the idea. So, Price would need three things to effectively break with tradition: (1) a functional "closer" for those times when Aroldis is used in earlier high leverage situations, (2) a bit of luck that a significant number of saves aren't blown before public/pundit acceptance of the switch, and (3) more than a bit of backbone to go along with complete confidence in the idea. 

Fortunately, the Reds have a couple of options for players who could handle 9th inning duties. While not bringing the dominance of Aroldis, some combination of J.J. Hoover, Jonathan Broxton, and Sean Marshall should be able to convert most save chances. 

Just to lend some legitimacy to the "relief ace" idea and illustrate that we could survive without Aroldis slamming the door, it's worth discussing an interesting Bill James/John Dewan rule of thumb on save chances. The 30-60-90 rule of saves sets forth the likely conversion rate in different save situations, which may make it more palatable to have a lesser reliever in some of these easier save chances.

Here's John Dewan on the idea:

What's the 30-60-90 rule of saves?
By John Dewan
May 18, 2005

The manager brings in a relief pitcher up by three runs in the ninth. The pitcher finishes the game and gets the save. It's done all the time, but in fact, it's not a good time to use what normally is the best pitcher on your team.

This situation falls under the category of Easy Save. An Easy Save is earned when a pitcher enters the game with a 2 or 3 run lead, no one on base and pitches one inning or less while finishing the game for a team victory. No need to use your best pitcher here. Pitchers convert these save opportunities about 90% of the time.

Use your best pitcher in a Tough Save situation. That happens when he enters the game with the tying run on base. The conversion rate for saves in this situation is only 30%.

All other saves or Regular Saves are converted at a 60% rate.

The 30-60-90 rule of saves: Tough saves—30% conversion. Regular saves—60%. Easy saves—90%.

The take-away from this 30-60-90 concept is that just about any pitcher is going to convert most of the "Easy Saves". And, one of the aforementioned non-Aroldis options would nail down most "Regular Saves". So, Aroldis isn't really needed in many of these save chances, which again supports the notion that he can be more impactful in the "Relief Ace" role. 

Aroldis may continue to resist a change to the rotation, but the Reds can still extract more value out of him by changing his usage pattern in the bullpen. Aroldis may not want to move INTO the rotation, but he can still be moved OUT OF the closer role. 

For a team that has made the playoffs but come up just short in consecutive years, wringing every last drop of production out of the roster and exploiting every possible competitive advantage is not only advisable, but necessary. The difference between losing in the first round of the playoffs and winning the World Series is razor thin and having a Relief Ace may make all the difference for the Reds.  

Thursday, December 5, 2013

Trade Thoughts: Hanigan and Holmberg

The writing has been on the wall for a couple of weeks. When the Reds signed Brayan Pena to a major league deal, it was clear that change was coming behind the dish. It arrived on Tuesday when the Reds dealt Ryan Hanigan to the Rays in a three team deal.

The long and short of the deal is Hanigan, Heath Bell, and cash to the Rays; lhp David Holmberg to the Reds; rhp Justin Choate and a player to be named later to the Diamondbacks.

In essence, the D-Backs get salary relief, the Rays get a defensive minded catcher to pair with Jose Molina, and the Reds get starting pitching depth at the upper levels of the system. On the surface and in a vacuum, the deal seems like a good one all the way around. However, digging a little deeper and adding a touch of context makes me wonder if the Reds did as well as they might think; whether they really know the value of what they gave up.

If you know anything about Moneyball, then you know that (1) Billy Beane didn't actually write it; (2) it's not actually about on-base percentage, but rather market inefficiencies; and (3) statistical analysis is just a tool, a means of collecting better information than the competition so that you can better identify those market inefficiencies.

Obviously, this all started with the Oakland A's, but it's quickly spread around the league and the Tampa Bay Rays are now one of the torchbearers of this movement. The combination of small payroll and large success is a clear indication that the Rays are exceptionally well run.

In light of that, it's more than a little disconcerting when an exceptionally well run organization is not only interested in the asset you are trying to dump, but immediately hands out a 3-year commitment to that player.

Do the Rays know something we don't? If so, what?

The question that Reds nation slapped on Ryan Hanigan last year was whether his bat would bounce back or whether diminished offensive performance was his new reality. There was a lot of concern and hand-wringing over that very question.

What's curious is that the Rays don't seem to care one single whit about his offense. If you were concerned about a player bouncing back after a down year, then you wouldn't immediately hand him a multi-year deal. Instead, you'd wait until the next data point established a trend line.

If the Rays are confident enough in Hanigan to give him that guaranteed money, then it seems reasonable to infer that they find a substantial amount of value in Hanigan's defense. So much so that it makes his offensive contributions largely irrelevant.

So, why do the Rays value Hanigan's defense so much more than the Reds? I suspect the Rays have developed a proprietary metric for valuing pitch-framing and that Ryan Hanigan grades out very highly. That would be the type of information edge that enables the Rays to exploit a market inefficiency that the Reds don't see.

Pitch framing is still an a developing area, one where the proprietary information of MLB organizations outpaces the information available in the public domain. However, early studies indicate that pitch framing can have massive impact on run prevention. You can read about pitch framing here, here, here, and here.

Here's a summary blurb from one of those articles about the impact of pitch framing:

Despite using different methods, we all came to the conclusion that catchers who can (and cannot) frame pitches have a huge impact on the game: Dan estimated that the top catchers can contribute as much as .7 runs per 150 pitches (roughly a game), Bill calculated approximately six wins per 120 games, and both Mike and I quantified the effect at around 20 runs per 120 games.

These early studies are finding that pitch framing can add/subtract several wins to a team's record over the course of a season. That's a stunning finding with jaw dropping results, but one that makes intuitive sense. Impact is frequently a function of opportunity. Opportunity was a large part of my write-up on the RBI issue in a previous post. It's the same for pitch framing. A catcher handles somewhere in the neighborhood of 120-150 pitches per game. Every single pitch is an opportunity for the catcher to steal, or give back, a strike. Stealing a strike can flip the "count probability" in a pitcher's favor or even directly result in an out. If impact is a function of opportunity, then catchers have more opportunity to impact the game than any position on the field due to pitch framing.

If you look at those studies, then two of the names you consistently see at the top of the list are "Jose Molina" and "Ryan Hanigan". More accurately, Jose seems to be otherworldly, while Hanigan is merely very good. The Rays clearly appreciate Jose Molina and it's certainly not for his bat. It's not underasonable to infer that they value Hanigan for the same reasons as Molina. This seems like an under-the-radar move that may have substantial impact on the Rays in 2014. Even if Hanigan's offense doesn't rebound to previous levels, the Rays may have just added 2+ wins to their 2014 record in defensive value alone.

I must admit, I've never really understood why the Reds felt such a pressing need to deal Ryan Hanigan unless they really felt they needed to save a couple of million. I suppose I would feel better about dealing Hanigan, and giving away his defensive contributions, if Devin Mesoraco had shown more with the bat in 2013. As it stands, Hanigan's defensive contribution may be more valuable than Mesoraco's offensive contribution. It'll be very interesting to see if the Reds pitching staff as a whole takes a step backwards in 2014 without Ryan Hanigan. The Rays may have added 2+ wins in defensive value, but will the Reds lose 2+ wins in defensive value?

There is certainly still hope that Mesoraco can be the type of hitter we thought he might be, but I just can't buy into the idea that he has failed because of a lack of consistent playing time. He has 589 MLB plate appearances under his belt, which is more than enough for him to have shown what he can do. At some point, a player creates his own playing time. Mesoraco failed to do so. 

I still have hope that Mesoraco is just a tick behind where we would expect him to be because of a cold weather amateur career and pre-pro ball Tommy John surgery, both of which cost him needed development time. Also, he was slow to figure things out in the minors, so it's possible that he just takes longer to make needed adjustments. Mesoraco will get his chance in 2014 without the Ryan Hanigan safety net. The Reds need him to step forward offensively because right out of the gate it's a clear defensive downgrade.   

As for David Holmberg, I like him. He was actually a player I picked in my 2009 shadow draft. His calling card is his plus change-up, which I always like to see in a young pitcher. He's a good pickup for the Reds and a much needed one in light of the lack of upper level starting pitching depth in the system. The Reds just can't expect good health in the rotation and Holmberg is a better option for MLB starts than Greg Reynolds. So, Holmberg should be an upgrade on the spot starts the team received in 2013.

Whether this trade works out for the Reds depends largely on the progress of Devin Mesoraco. I like David Holmberg, but I wonder if the Reds undervalued what Ryan Hanigan brings to the table. I suspect the Rays have developed a more accurate valuation on Hanigan than the Reds, which probably makes this trade a winner for the Rays and one that will show up in the standings in non-obvious ways. When sitting around next season trying to figure out why the Rays are always so strong, think back to this deal and how the organization extracts value from unexpected places.

As for the Reds, they addressed a need (SP depth), saved some pocket change, and cleared the way for a homegrown talent to emerge. It's a deal that makes sense on a number of levels, but I can't help but think that they didn't fully appreciate the value that Ryan Hanigan created.

2014 Armchair GM Thoughts

Well, I haven't written anything in a little while, so I thought it would be fun to put a toe back in the water before getting into the heavy lifting of prospect write-ups and more heavily analytical posts. In that spirit, here is a fun bit of speculation on something the Reds GM could do to improve the team this offseason.

As mentioned in the previous post, the Reds problem in 2013 was a complete lack of complimentary offensive production. Basically, they were a three hitter offense and one of those three is undoubtedly headed out of town. The problem is that there are few areas where legitimate upgrades can be made, namely catcher, third base, and shortstop.

The Reds may also be facing a rapidly closing window. The team isn't getting any younger and the starting pitchers are only getting closer to free agency. As it stands, Homer Bailey is set to reach free agency after the 2014 season; Johnny Cueto and Mat Latos after the 2015 season.

The question the Reds must answer is whether they are going to make a big push to win a championship in the next couple of seasons or try to be consistently competitive for the next 5 years. If it's the former, then they need to convert the future value of assets into present value. If it's the latter, then the strategy is identifying which assets to keep in the fold and which prospects can be promoted to replace players who are either aged or priced out of the organization.

The decision is complicated by the recent success of the Cardinals and Pirates, who may well have more talent at both the MLB and minor league levels. So, do the Reds go all in now or try to hold the window open for the foreseeable future?

If we want to "win now", then we have two surplus assets that could help us do that: Robert Stephenson and Aroldis Chapman. Stephenson is an asset with purely future value, while Chapman is an asset whose potential is continues to outpace his production. If we want to make a push this year and compete with not just the Cardinals and Pirates, but the AL's best as well, then here are two "win now" moves* I would consider making:

*(These moves are in the broad strokes and may need a tweak or a sweetener added to balance them out)

1) Robert Stephenson to the Mariners for SS Brad Miller and 2b/of Dustin Ackley

Stephenson could be a top five overall prospect in the near future and a legit #1 starter down the road. He's a hefty trade chip. That said, he probably needs at least another full season of development. And, another year in the minors comes with both injury and development risk. If we want to reshape the lineup with an eye towards improvement in 2014, then he may be our best bet.

As for the return, I'm already a huge Brad Miller fan. He has tools, skills, and intangibles and, on some level, the world just seems to make more sense when the Reds have a top drawer shortstop in the starting lineup. The Mariners promoted him midseason and used him as their leadoff hitter and shortstop. Miller has the ability to control the strike zone, hit for average, and hit for respectable power. He's probably average defensively at short, so he'd be a slight downgrade from the above-average glove of Zack Cozart. That said, he also brings top-flight intangibles to the table and could emerge as the leader this team seemed to lack in 2013, as evidenced by his amateur travel team coach Chet Lemon calling him "a coach's dream". Cozart is a 2.0-2.5 win player and I suspect he's reached his ceiling. I could see Brad Miller as a 4.5-5.0 win player at his peak, which could make him a significant upgrade for the Reds over Zach Cozart.

Still, given Stephenson's trade value, I'd also want Dustin Ackley in the deal. Ackley does a lot of things well. He hits line drives, makes contact at a strong clip, draws walks at a respectable rate, and doesn't chase many bad pitches. He's a pure hitter with very good hand-eye coordination, reminding me of Dustin Pedroia in that respect. To date, however, Ackley has been a massive disappointment, but I think he's fixable and I'd roll the dice on being able to do just that. Ackley has a clear swing flaw, he doesn't firm up his front side, instead letting his hips and front knee slide forward, which robs him of the rotational power generated by the hips. His hand-eye coordination is so strong that it actually works against him here, as the weak front side flaw doesn't prevent him from making contact, but does prevent him from driving the ball with authority. Given that the Mariners have been a huge disappointment as of late, they may be willing to turn the page on Ackley.

This deal would give us Miller at shortstop and Ackley in center until Hamilton is ready. Once Hamilton is ready, Ackley could split time in left/center, providing an insurance policy for both Ludwick and Hamilton, and be a backup for Phillips at second and Votto at first. If either the Reds or Ludwick decide not to exercise the mutual option for 2015, then Ackley could take over in left.

If we can unlock Ackley's bat, then this deal would give us two professional, impact hitters atop the lineup and holding down up-the-middle positions. Stephenson is a high price to pay, but these two could provide us with an immediate boost and significantly greater complimentary production.

2) Aroldis Chapman and Zach Cozart to the Padres for 3b Chase Headley and RHP Burch Smith

Chapman is another asset that could be both expendable and valuable. Chapman posted a 1.6 WAR this year, which means that his hype/trade value outpaces his actual value, making him an attractive trade option. The Reds either need to extract more value from Chapman or flip him. The only real way to extract more value from him is to shift him to the rotation, but if that fails then his trade value takes a hit. Frankly, I would much rather deal him and let someone else assume the risk of converting him to the rotation, especially since Chapman himself has expressed a desire to work out of the bullpen.

That said, I would move Chapman to the Padres for Chase Headley and Burch Smith. Headley had a down season last year after a true power breakout season in 2012. So, there is some performance risk in the deal. However, even if the 2012 power isn't sustainable, he posted a .374 OBP in 2011 and a .376 OBP in 2012.  That type of OBP would take the sting out of losing Shin Soo Choo. While Headley's true power remains something of a question, a move from Petco Park to GABP will only help him in that department. And, his OBP would look mighty good in the 2nd spot in the order ahead of Joey Votto, which would also give him better pitches to hit. 

Headley is only under team control for 1 more season, so we would likely be entitled to something more for 3 years of Chapman. I would want RHP Burch Smith, who is rumored to be on the block and who I like quite a bit. Smith has a very good change-up, a low 90s fastball that can touch 95, and good control. He is on a development path to being a solid mid-rotation starter and he would join David Holmberg in improving our pitching depth in the upper levels of the minors. 

Final Thoughts

These two moves give us two potential offensive upgrades (B.Miller over Z.Cozart and C.Headley over T.Frazier), vastly improved MLB depth (D.Ackley and T.Frazier off the bench), and more starting pitching depth in the upper minors (B.Smith). The Reds main problem last year was a top heavy offense, but the team also lacked depth. 

Given the inevitable injuries and the preference of all MLB managers for, as our former peerless leader Dusty Baker said, "having options", this would make us a more balanced and deeper offensive team. Headley in a hitter friendly park and hitting in front of a former MVP could have another breakout season. Miller could hit 20+ homers as soon as next year with a solid slash line. And, I would still have Ackley and Frazier in my plans for the future, as I think both can get back on track and emerge as valuable MLB players, but having them serve as depth on the bench for 2014 wouldn't be the worst idea. 

After those trades, the roster would look something like the following: 

1. B.Miller ss l
2. C.Headley 3b s
3. J.Votto 1b l
4. R.Ludwick lf r
5. J.Bruce rf l
6. B.Phillips 2b r
7. B.Hamilton cf s
8. D.Mesoraco c r

c. B.Pena s
inf T.Frazier r
inf J.Hannahan l
of S.Schumaker l
of/2b D.Ackley l

Obviously, there's no clear back-up shortstop, but I wouldn't be that uncomfortable with going without one on a game-to-game basis. If Miller were to get hurt, then we could call someone up from the minors. Until that time, I wouldn't mind having a more offense heavy bench with a few guys who could handle shortstop in a pinch (Frazier, Phillips, Hannahan). 

And, if Hamilton can handle MLB pitching, then he'd be the leadoff man. If Hamilton is so lost that he needs to back to the minors, then Ackley would take over in centerfield and we could add a true backup shortstop to the bench. Dusty was right, it's good to have options.   

1. M.Latos r
2. H.Bailey r
3. J.Cueto r
4. T.Cingrani l
5. M.Leake r

6. D.Holmberg triple-A lhp
7. B.Smith triple-A rhp

cl J.J. Hoover
rhset J.Broxton
lhset S.Marshall
mr A.Simon
mr L.Ondrusek
mr M.Parra
lr S.LeCure

Obviously, giving up Robert Stephenson wouldn't be popular and for very good reason. He is the Reds best pitching prospect since Homer Bailey and I'm just as high on him as everyone else. But, if we are really trying to go all-in for the next two seasons, then it might be wise to consider moving him. It took Homer Bailey a long time to emerge as a dependable, impact starting pitcher. And, it's unreasonable to expect Stephenson to reach that status within the next 2-3 seasons, or longer. 

If the Reds decide that our window is now, then Stephenson is an asset that simply won't help us. On the other hand, if the Reds aren't going all in for the next two years, then you simply don't move a prospect the caliber of Stephenson, not at any cost. If the organization wants to try to maintain consistent, year-in/year-out success, then Stephenson is exactly the type of player the Reds need in the system. 

Anyway, that's a fun post to get back in the swing of things. I suspect most will be apoplectic at the mere idea of trading Stephenson and Aroldis, but it's something to consider if we think we can win a championship in the near future. That would be a strategy that requires syncing up the present value of our assets. On the other hand, if we aren't going all in, then forget I wrote this.